

# From Community Based to Community Driven; The evolution of the Commons Management in the Okavango Delta, Botswana

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## Abstract

Botswana was one of the countries in Southern Africa that pioneered Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) twenty years ago, together with Zimbabwe, Zambia and Namibia. Whilst the different countries have recorded different levels of success, within Botswana, different commentators have evaluated the programme and scored it differently. Some argue that CBNRM has suffered multiple failures; It has failed to devolve management authority of local resources to communities as well as failed to generate significant benefits to improve the quality of life of rural communities. The same commentators also argue that where conservation of species occurred, it was merely incidental, having little or no direct casual effect from CBNRM. However, other commentators argue that CBNRM has had a mixed bag of results, excelling in some objectives and failing in others. Noticeably, these commentators argue that CBNRM has injected revenue in rural villages and reduced the levels of poaching. In this paper we reviewed the roles played by facilitators within five CBNRM projects in four Okavango Delta villages of Mababe, Seronga, Gudigwa and Tubu. Emerging from the analysis is a critical role in the CBNRM process that should be played by an actor that we refer to as the Broker, without whom the process is bound to struggle. The success and failures that have been experienced in CBNRM depict firstly the presence or absence of a Broker. Secondly they depict the strengths and weaknesses of the Broker. We conclude that the niche for a Broker is a permanent one and its fulfilment will transform natural resource management from Community Based to Community Driven. What may change over time is the profile and origin of the broker.

Key words: CBNRM, Broker, Brokerage, Stakeholders, Facilitation

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## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

While not alone in its widespread implementation of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM), the experiences of communities in Botswana engaged in CBNRM are diverse and instructive for better understanding the successes and failures of the idea of CBNRM as a whole. The goals of CBNRM have been extensively discussed elsewhere (for example, Agrawal and Gibson 2001; Berkes 2004; Hackel 1999; Hill 1996; Jones 1999; Murphree 2002); after these authors it will suffice to say that CBNRM is supposed to make conservation affordable for people who have to live with wildlife by bringing benefits to the local level. The movement started in the 1980s, but by the late 1990s criticisms of this new participatory resource management approach were mushrooming not only in Botswana but in all of Southern (and Eastern) Africa as a whole (see for example, Agrawal and Gibson 2001; Brosius et al 1998; Campbell and Vainio-Mattila 2003; Chatty and Colchester 1999; Coffman 2003; Hill 1996; Songorwa 1999, Blaikie 2006, Galvin and Haller 2008). These critiques suggested that at best, CBNRM benefited communities in marginal ways, and at worst, it bred corruption and financial mismanagement. While CBNRM was credited with some conservation successes, it appeared to be failing to bring socio-economic benefits to the local communities who were participating in its implementation.

In theory, Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM), is a rather elegant idea that holds that rural livelihoods and key ecosystems in Third World countries can be improved and maintained through the sustainable utilization of natural resources by local people supported by states and global society (Swatuk 2005). Proponents of community conservation present CBNRM as a means of reconciling conservation and development objectives by ensuring that the interests of local people are taken into account in making trade-offs (Jones 1999, Swatuk 2005, Thakadu 1997). CBNRM as a concept is carefully crafted and is infused with notions such as democracy, participation and biodiversity conservation. It is a development framework that brings an entirely new machinery involving the state, donors and powerful international conservation organisations into areas that were traditionally the preserve of anthropologists and historians. However, some critics see it as a challenge to the state-led, scientific management that is necessary to guarantee the preservation of biodiversity (Adams and Hulme 2001).

Never before has rural development been a juxtaposition of varied stakeholders presumably all wanting to assist local communities improve their livelihoods through collective natural resource management. The task appeared straight forward as all these stakeholders brought with them most of the requisite elements for the success of CBNRM.

Commentators of CBNRM in most cases analyse the views of the promoters on one hand and the critics on the other. Promoters of community projects are however not neutral and impartial, they have their biases and pursue their own agendas and the agendas of those they represent (Friedmann 1992). The most important views, that of the community engaged in CBNRM are rarely heard, and if they are voiced, no in-depth analysis to interrogate the genesis of the views is provided.

There is therefore merit in studying the process of how CBNRM happens, how the different actors and stakeholders interact, how the interactions are managed, who manages the process and how well equipped they are to manage the it. In this paper we reviewed the roles played by facilitators within five CBNRM projects in four Okavango Delta villages of Sankuyo, Seronga, Gudigwa and Tubu.

## **2.0 CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND**

Borrini-Feyerabend et al.(2004) has stated that there are two dimensions to natural resource management (NRM), namely content and process. They described natural resource management as “responding appropriately to ecological characteristics of a given environment, preserving its integrity and functions, while assuring a flow of benefits from it”, i.e. content – what & when. Secondly, it is “responding to the social characteristics of the same environment, dealing in an effective way with the inevitably conflicting interests and concerns of different social actors, i.e. process-who and how”.

In dealing with the process of NRM, there has been hostile struggles, violence, war, litigation and / or subtle forms of social control (especially under open access) as a result of collapse of a commons management system (Bolaane 2004, Magole & Magole 2009). These have then necessitated the development of collaborative management solutions.

These solutions have been crafted through a series of questions that are widely found in NRM literature. Examples include IIED (1994) report reviewing community approaches to wildlife management which questioned ‘whose Eden?’. Adams & Hulme (2001), reiterated the question, ‘If Community Conservation is the Answer in Africa, what is the question?’. Kaimowitz and Sheil (2007) asked ‘Conserving what and for whom and then?’ Demotts and Hoon (2008) asked “ Whose Elephants?. Magole and Magole (2009) asked ‘The Okavango, whose delta is it?’

The common thread coming out of these studies is the reconciliation of conservation and development objectives by ensuring that the interests of local people are taken into account in making trade-offs. But as Borrini-Feyerabend et al.(2004) explains, responding to the social characteristics and dealing with inevitably conflicting

interests of different social actors is the biggest challenge in CBNRM, i.e. who and how.

There are three distinct groups of players in CBNRM. These are:

a) Community; group(s) of people living within close proximity of the Resource(s)

b) Donor; Organisation(s) providing financial and material resources for the exploitation of resource(s) to benefit local community and national economy.

These may be;

- Government
- Local and or International Donors
- Local & International NGOs
- Private Company/individual

c) Process Facilitator; Organisation(s) providing the human resources and technical expertise to drive the process of resource(s) exploitation and ultimate realisation of benefits by local community and national economy. These may be;

- Government Department
- Local and or International Donor(s)
- Local and or International NGOs
- Private Company/individual
- Research / Knowledge Institutions

In literature, players in CBNRM are documented mainly as communities and promoters and have been profiled extensively (Mbaiwa 2005, 2007, 2009, Boggs 2000, Swatuk 2005, Arntzen et al. 2003, Magole & Magole 2005, Thakadu 2004). Table 1 captures some of the profile traits of communities and donors.

**Table 1: Some profile traits of Communities and Donors**

<b>Community</b>	<b>Promoter(s)</b>
Low levels of education, high illiteracy levels	High education levels, but limited knowledge of community dynamics
Heterogeneous though may appear homogeneous to an	Insensitivity to the implications of the heterogeneity of the community.

outsider	Communities usually wrongly assumed to be homogeneous. Sectarian funding approach
Reside in remote areas with no basic infrastructure like power, roads & telecommunications	Funding agenda conceived in developed countries or urban centres where availability of basic infrastructure may be taken for granted
Absence of productive age groups (21-40 years) and strong edge to relocate to urban centres (rural-urban migration)	Usually the cream of the national population and may be insensitivity to the implications of the absent productive population in rural areas
Community development priorities may not be explicitly communicated	Mismatch of development priorities between promoter and local community
Raised expectations and unrealistic returns expected from resource exploitation	Casual management of community expectations
Unfamiliarity with project management	Short-term funding and short technical support commitments. Piece-meal approach
	Doubling roles of donor and process facilitator

As shown in Table 1, in many CBNRM projects, the role of donor and process facilitator have been subsumed into one. Under this arrangement, many assumptions were made by donors which later proved incorrect. In instances where there was a process facilitator, the role of process facilitation was treated lightly and assigned to incompetent and under resourced organisations. IIED (1994) concluded after reviewing several approaches to community wildlife management that “Institutional capacity-building at local level is rarely addressed and in many areas, institutions remain undeveloped. Cases exist where local institutions are far from democratic and projects fail because benefits are not distributed equitably. Problems also arise where a project has been initiated by high-level patronage without committed support from all government agencies concerned. If that patronage is subsequently removed, previously aggrieved parties may seek ‘revenge’, thus undermining the project. Some efforts continue to depend heavily on outside funding which stifles attempts to make management more self-supportive, whilst the government in most cases retains political and legislative control”.

The concept of a Broker is widely used in business and management sciences. A broker is a party that mediates between a buyer and a seller. There are many types of brokers e.g. Stock broker, Insurance broker, Investment broker, Real estate broker, Customs broker, Information broker etc. A broker is distinguished from an agent because an agent acts on behalf of a seller or buyer. All brokers undergo specialised training and usually sit for qualifying examinations administered by a qualified certifying body. A broker receives brokerage, i.e. a standard commission fee for their specialised service. Despite complex dynamics within CBNRM, the concept of a broker has not found its way into the CBNRM arena.

### **3.0 METHODOLOGY**

This study utilises secondary data from the authors previous work on villages in the Okavango Delta to compare CBNRM process facilitation in the villages of Mababe, Seronga, Gudigwa and Tubu. Each CBNRM project discussed is a case study for comparative analysis. The main sources of data are Magole (2009) for Mababe village, Magole et al (2009 in print) for Seronga, Magole & Magole (2007) for Gudigwa and Magole et al (2010 under review) for Tubu. The authors were directly involved in the formulation of the CBNRM projects in Gudigwa and Tubu, whilst their involvement in the formulation of the two Seronga CBNRM projects was peripheral. The review process follows the evolution of the specific CBNRM project with emphasis of the main actors who ensured the success and or failure of the projects. A primary focus is put on the role of the facilitator of the process; who did it, how and why.




Figure 1: Map showing four villages with CBNRM projects where the study was undertaken.

## 4.0 THE CASE STUDIES

### 4.1 Mababe CBNRM project

The village of Mababe has 300 residents (CSO 2002) and is located on the southeastern edge of the Okavango Delta and dominated almost entirely by Basarwa (San) people. The village was established in the 1980s by the government of Botswana as congregation centres for 'nomadic' hunter-gatherer Basarwa groups where they could be provided with certain services such as food rations and medical supplies during the drought of the mid 1980s (Magole 2009). Prior to this 'villagisation' process, small Basarwa clans that later formed this community utilised

natural resources the southern Okavango Delta and Mababe Depression (inside Chobe National Park) all the way down to the Nxai Pan & Makgadikgadi Pans National Parks (Parry and Campbell 1992).

The creation of the Wildlife Management Areas made Mababe a candidate for a CBNRM project. Mababe has operated a CBNRM project from 1998 through the Mababe Zokotsama Community Development Trust (MZCDT). The Department of Wildlife and National Parks conducted the initial community mobilisation and CBNRM facilitation. DWNP was assisted by Natural Resources Management Project (NRMP) a USAID funded project. The Mababe community had previously benefited from Special Game Licenses<sup>2</sup> (SPG), which the Department was keen to abolish as they felt license holders abused the system by poaching. As such, the process of CBNRM mobilization was rushed through so that communities could set up trusts. Once the trusts were set up, the licenses were terminated and subsistence needs were required to come out of the hunting quota given to the trust. The termination of the licenses became very unpopular at the local level, especially after the community quota system could not guarantee game meat to all members of the community.

Revenues for the community trust come from land rentals and hunting quotas paid by the joint venture partner. The Mababe Trust has progressively generated between USD100,000 and USD300,000 per annum. However, it is not immediately visible within the village through infrastructure or other improvements that the Trust handles such amounts. In fact, a closer look at the Trust's audit reports shows that operating expenditures equal income in most years, and in some years, expenditure exceeds income (e.g. in 2006).<sup>3</sup> Funds are spent on vehicles, including fuel and maintenance, which approaches 40% of total expenditure in 2006 for Mababe.<sup>4</sup> This trend suggests that because there is no public transport between their village (Mababe) and Maun (the main town where they get supplies), the Trust is utilizing funds to fulfil a basic need rather than investing in conservation. Although there have been no litigation cases for funds disappearing from the Trust, government officials as well as community members have accused the board of trustees of deliberately bending the rules to favour board members monetarily. These include holding more meetings than scheduled so as to claim more sitting allowances, and nepotism when there are job vacancies within the trust and/or with the joint venture partner.

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<sup>2</sup> Special Game Licenses were issued by DWNP to 'Remote Area Dwellers' (mainly Basarwa) to hunt for subsistence purposes throughout the whole year.

<sup>3</sup> Audited Financial Report for Mababe Zokotsama Community Development Trust, Meyer and Associates (2007)

<sup>4</sup> Other funds go to paying staff salaries, capital costs, student scholarships, donations and grants.



Over the last ten years of existence of a CBNRM project, there is little upward transformation of the socio-economic status of the people. High unemployment levels of 48% in Mababe, coupled with low levels of education and poverty, remain problematic (Magole et al 2008). Commercial wildlife utilisation is capital-intensive and requires specialised business, marketing, and other skills (MEWT 2007), which are essential prerequisites that the communities lack and are finding it difficult to acquire through CBNRM. The joint venture partnerships between the community and the private safari companies do not seem to be facilitating the transfer of knowledge and skills as originally envisaged by CBNRM promoters. This has resulted in resource capture and control by empowered actors such as the state, safari operators and local elites, as well as the further marginalisation of these subordinate communities lacking power to resist or negotiate resource access and fair trade with dominant groups (Taylor 2007). At the same time, the perceived – and real – disadvantages associated with living near wildlife relate to personal danger and losses to crops and livestock. Despite its stated purposes, then, CBNRM is often unable to compensate effectively for these costs, and the communities remain peripheral in a scheme that was arguably intended to benefit them.

#### ***4.2 Seronga Okavango Community Trust CBNRM Project***

Seronga is currently the largest village in the north eastern part of the Okavango Delta with a population of 3043, (CSO 2002), made up of predominantly Bayei and Hambukushu peoples. CBNRM has taken several institutional forms in Seronga and adjacent panhandle villages, indicating a complex history that challenges CBNRM's narrative tendency to homogenize local conservation and development efforts. This section focuses primarily on two community based organizations in the area – the Okavango Community Trust (OCT) and the Okavango Polers Trust (OPT).

The OCT was registered in 1995, with its first community enterprise and joint venture agreement in 1997. It includes the villages of Seronga, Gunitsoga, Beetsha, Eretsha, and Gudigwa. After a rushed process to establish the Trust under pressure from the private sector, the villages became able to enter lease agreements for both hunting and photographic safaris in two areas with high economic potential for tourism,<sup>5</sup> and sub-leased those areas (referred to as NG 22 and 23 – see Figure 1) to Michelleti Bates Safaris under much controversy (Hoon 2004). The constitution of the Trust gave more power to a Board of Trustees rather than village level representatives and was unclear about voting and re-tendering procedures.

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<sup>5</sup> NG 22 and 23 are adjacent to Moremi Game Reserve, which is one of the prominent tourist areas because of the concentration of wildlife. Safari operators therefore have a keen interest in gaining access to these particular community areas.

The early history of the Okavango Community Trust reflects the importance of the commercial interests of the safari operator and how those interests in many ways managed to short-circuit the participatory aspects of CBNRM (Hoon 2004). Its current concession to Wilderness Safaris, which includes the sale of its hunting quota which Wilderness purchases but does not use, brings in 2.5 million pula per year. While it employs a manager, secretary, radio operators, and drivers, it also pays its board members 800 pula per meeting as a sitting allowance - a dramatic increase from its original level of 100 pula (Hoon 2004). This is seen by many as a way for local elites to enrich themselves at OCT's table. But OCT also seeks to use some of its income for community projects; it has built tuck shops in several outlying villages, and in mid-2007 opened a long-awaited mortuary in Seronga. While from an external point of view this may be a rather ghoulish emblem of CBNRM, in local context it reflects the provision of an important service. As there is no electricity on the eastern side of the panhandle, funerals previously either had to be conducted immediately or bodies had to be sent across the river or up to Shakawe to be kept so as to prevent decay. Allowing some days to go by before the funeral must be held creates crucial cultural space in which relatives can travel and thus attend funerals. As funerals are costly in themselves, the additional expense of having to transport corpses to delay funerals was often beyond the reach of many local residents. In this way, the Okavango Community Trust is providing a public good which the state and private enterprise have not made available.

#### **4.3 Seronga Okavango Polers Trust CBNRM Project**

In contrast to the Okavango Community Trust, which was a 'top-down' initiative, Okavango Polers Trust (OPT) emerged from grassroots mobilization. Within a few years of OCT's creation, Bayei elders in Seronga and Gunitsoga (some of whom had been involved in OCT and previously worked in the tourism industry in Maun) began to discuss the possibility of forming a local organization of *mekoro* polers to benefit from tourism.<sup>6</sup> They contacted one of the local safari operators, a hunter and entrepreneur couple who had moved to Seronga, to tender for the concession for OCT that eventually went to another safari operator. With the couple's help, the local Bayei elders registered the Okavango Polers Trust in 1999. Even though the organization's name is the Okavango Polers Trust, it is not a community trust like OCT and other USAID-supported CBNRM projects, but rather (according to its constitution) a group of member with similar occupations. The reasoning behind this decision was to restrict membership to *mekoro* polers in the safari industry. The Poler's Trust employs 75 members and about 20 casual polers, all of whom work on a roster system with each group led by a professional guide. The membership is thus all male, mostly from Seronga and Gunitsoga, and primarily Bayei, who are traditionally considered to be the ethnic group which introduced the *mekoro* to the area (Sorensen 2003). The Poler's Trust also has a board and management staff that run its camp and guest rooms. Work as a poler is a tool in fighting poverty; the

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<sup>6</sup> Mekoros are dugout canoes made most often from a Jackal Berry tree (*Diospyros mespiliformis*). These canoes were traditionally used by the Bayei to navigate the Delta.

majority of men employed as polers in 2003, for example, did not previously have cash-generating income (Sorensen 2003). The Okavango Polers Trust thus generates income directly from the tourists who use their services for overnight mekoro trips and photographic safaris.

While the Poler's Trust has had some financial management problems – especially the tendency of funds to 'go missing' – the hiring of a new accountant in 2007 appears to have addressed a substantial portion of these difficulties. Both projects have struggled with the mismanagement of financial resources as well as the use of the trusts' resources for private ends. However, the Polers is a smaller, more tight-knit group; many of the polers are related to each other, and its status as a membership organization means that their commitment to improving the trust has remained consistent and reflects a sense of ownership that is much greater than in the Okavango Community Trust. The Polers Trust has also relied in part on external funding and grants from donors and government, which may have given it more space to locally adapt the principles of participatory decision-making, keeping records and minutes, creating rules, and ensuring accountability. The Polers' position as a smaller, more focused organization has also distanced it from notions of public accountability and instead focused more on accountability to its members, which is perhaps a more modest goal than demonstrating financial responsibility to the Okavango Community Trust's five villages.

The Okavango Community Trust's reliance on the private sector for its income also shapes the ways in which it is perceived at the local level and how communities can become reliant on external actors for benefits. Rumours sometimes arise about trust board members receiving payments or kickbacks from safari owners (Hoon 2004). But safari owners can also become 'embedded' in the local economy as patrons through such acts as contributing a coffin and cows to a local chief's funeral (Hoon 2004). In these ways, then, benefits from CBNRM are translated into the local context in ways that affect the legitimacy of different stakeholders. OCT has had financial problems, but it has also initiated projects that address local needs.

#### ***4.4 Gudigwa Bukhakhwe Conservation and Cultural Trust CBNRM Project***

Gudigwa village is located on the north eastern part of the Okavango Delta in Ngamiland District, Botswana. It is the last village on a string of villages that stretches from Mohembo East village at the border with Namibia and are scattered along the Okavango Delta Panhandle. Gudigwa is located 65km northeast of Seronga village.

The village was established in 1987 by the Remote Area Development Program (RADP) as a service centre for nomadic Basarwa (San) groups. Gudigwa has a population of about 732 people (CSO, 2002, 2004). The Basarwa of Gudigwa are a

composition of eight main clans that came from eight different areas. Taylor (2000) notes that most of the people of Gudigwa came from //Gam/wi, and Letshaobe settlements not far from present day Gudigwa. The names of the eight main clans are Xhondoro, Xharango, Gwakeqwe, Xhwatau, Ghicudza, Xhwakatsu, Hqwengu and Thobokhuru (Mbaiwa & Rantsudu 2004).

The livelihood activities of the people of Gudigwa include livestock rearing and limited dry land farming, gathering, employment in Safari companies and Government sponsored drought relief projects. Gudigwa village is also part of the Okavango Community Trust (OCT), in conjunction with four other neighbouring villages in pursuit of Community Based Natural Resource Management projects. However the San community felt largely marginalised in the OCT. In response to the dissatisfaction an international conservation NGO, Conservation International (CI) mobilised residents of Gudigwa to come up with their own CBNRM project (CI 1999).

With technical assistance from Conservation International (CI) and financial aid from several donor agencies, Gudigwa established Bukhakhwe Conservation and Cultural Trust (BCCT). The Trust constructed a ten-bed ecotourism camp which was official opened in March 2003. On behalf of the trust CI negotiated a marketing agreement with one of the biggest and powerful safari company in Botswana, Okavango Wilderness Safaris (OWS) to bring clients to the camp.

Initially it appeared that the NGO was assisting the community with no motive of its own, however it turned out that by partnering with Gudigwa, CI hoped to lobby government to allocate Gudigwa NG13, a concession area on the border with Namibia. Once allocated, CI would then advocate for the area to become part of a conservation corridor joining the Okavango Delta with Bwabwata National Park in Namibia and conservation areas in Angola (CI 2000).

The Gudigwa camp only operated for two seasons as it was burnt down twice in what was rumoured to be arson (Magole & Magole 2007). Many people had benefitted during construction of the camp either through direct employment or sale of construction materials. However, when the camp opened for business, only a handful of people were employed. This created jealousy among those who remained unemployed and are believed to be the ones who torched the camp. Basarwa as an ethnic group remain largely marginalised and are more likely to face exclusion from other groups (Hitchcock and Bisele 2000).

#### ***4.5 Tubu Joint Management Committee CBNRM Project***

Tubu village is 10km east of Gumare on the now dry Thaoge River, west of the Okavango Delta. The village has a population of 1665 people (CSO 2002). Villagers are still largely dependent on natural resources for livelihood. Traditional areas of natural resource collection extend across the western Buffalo Fence into concession areas NG 24, 25 and 26 (see Fig 1). The progressive drying of the Thaoge distributary has resulted in an increased intensity of use of the Karongana system to the east, partly within the Wildlife Management Area (WMA). Villagers have been

denied access to the resources within the WMA on occasion and this has caused tension between locals and concessionaires (Biokavango 2009). Therefore a strategy to deal with the conflict and facilitate the community's access to resources was needed.

The facilitation for Tubu village was done through a University of Botswana project called Biokavango Project which had the objective to build local capacity to manage natural resources. Biokavango span over a five year period (2006-2010) and worked in some of the "hotspots" that were identified during the preparation of the Okavango Delta Management Plan. Tubu area was identified as a bedrock of land use conflict as well as high levels of poaching. The Biokavango intervention process involved a stakeholder analysis, followed by a needs assessment and a facilitated negotiations process between and amongst stakeholders to develop common understanding of issues. This process was undertaken through Kgotla meetings, community workshops and key stakeholder interviews. In November 2007, all stakeholders with interest in the Tubu area agreed to setup a Joint Management Committee (JMC), made up of representatives from the Local Community, Government Departments, Private Sector and Non-Governmental Organizations. The mandate of the JMC was to setup a forum at which issues concerning Tubu stakeholders could be discussed and negotiated. The JMC agreed to meet quarterly from January 2008 and to hold community meetings twice a year to give feedback.

The first task of the JMC was to develop a code of conduct for members and come up with a strategy for the community to access resources. To that end the JMC developed an integrated management plan for the Tubu conservation area (Biokavango 2009). The JMC also agreed to adopt the Management Orientated Monitoring System (MOMS) for the community to monitor resources and activities within their area. Five resource monitoring registers were developed which covered a) Problem Animal b) Molapo farming, c) Important Wildlife Species, d) Livestock and e) harvesting and use of Veldt resource such as thatching grass and medicinal and edible plants. Tubu conservation area was divided into six sub-areas through a community mapping exercise. Twelve Community Rangers were selected by the community and trained over a period of three months in data collection. The ten Community Rangers were then engaged to monitor resources, activities and events in each sub-area starting November 2009. Two of the Community Rangers were engaged as supervisors to each supervise activities in three of the sub-areas.

The JMC together with the people of Tubu have agreed on their development priorities, identified economic activities and are in the process of soliciting funds from prospective donors to fund their plans.

## **5.0 DISCUSSION and CONCLUSION**

According to Kaimowitz and Sheil 2007 "for hundreds of millions of people, biodiversity is about eating, staying healthy and finding shelter. Meeting these

people’s basic needs should receive greater priority in the conservation agenda first and foremost”. From the case studies presented it is clear that the early promoters paid much attention to CBNRM content and rhetoric.

Firstly, the distinction of roles was marred, resulting in underestimating and underrating facilitation of the CBNRM process. It appears the early promoters of CBNRM assumed that facilitation of CBNRM was the least of the tasks, as long as there was a resource to be exploited and funds to organise a community to form a Trust, the deal was done. This is evident from the doubling up of tasks e.g. by DWNP in the case of Mabebe ZDT and OCT, playing the roles of the both donor and facilitator simultaneously. CI also played the same roles in the Gudigwa case.


**Table 2: Comparison of attributes between the CBNRM projects of Mababe ZDT, OCT, OPT, BCCT & Tubu JMC**

<b>Attributes</b>	<b>Mababe ZDT</b>	<b>OCT</b>	<b>OPT</b>	<b>BCCT</b>	<b>Tubu JMC</b>
<b>Resources</b>	Wildlife (hunting & photographic safari)	Wildlife (hunting & photographic safari)	Wildlife (Mokoro poling)	Basarwa culture	Wildlife (photographic safari, Crocodile farming), Yei culture, veld resource harvesting
<b>Communities</b>	Mababe village	Seronga, Gonotsoga, Ereetsha, Beetsha & Gudigwa	Yei Polers of Seronga & Gonutsoga villages	Gudigwa village	Tubu village & surrounding cattle posts
<b>Donor(s)</b>	USAID/DWNP	DWNP	ADF	CI, UK Lottery	GEF
<b>Process Facilitator</b>	DWNP/NRMP	DWNP	Independent Consultant	CI	UB Biokavango Project
<b>Underlying motivation for project</b>	Termination of SGL by DWNP	Termination of SGL by DWNP	Domination of Yei by Hambukushu in OCT	1. Domination of OCT by four other villages members at the expense of Gudigwa. 2. Creation of conservation corridor between Botswana, Namibia & Angola	Bedrock of land use conflicts between community on one hand and NG25 concessionaire and DWNP on the other

				by CI	
<b>Evidence of planning in the CBNRM facilitation process</b>	Trust constitution,	Trust constitution	Trust constitution Business plan for camp only	Trust constitution, Business plan for camp only	Community company constitution, Fisheries cooperative, Integrated management plan, business plans for identified business activities & Code of Conduct

A second observation from the CBNRM cases under discussion is that promoters of CBNRM were pushing their own agendas as well. Whilst a project may have several objectives, it is likely that the promoters could have put more or less energy/resources depending on how their own objectives were being realised, sometimes at the detriment of communities. In the Mababe ZDT and the OCT cases, the Government (DWNP) was pushing CBNRM on their own timescale and to achieve amongst things abolishment of Special Game Licenses. As a result, the process facilitation was rushed, paying little attention to the complex dynamics of the communities involved. The OCT case in fact was very complex, as it involved five different villages with varying dynamics such as service availability, infrastructure and ethnicity. It is not surprising that there was discontent within OCT that resulted in the formation of two splinter trusts.

When reviewing the processes of facilitation for CBNRM, the main products are the Trust constitutions (see Table 2). It is only the Tubu JMC that developed an integrated management plan for the Tubu conservation area that address the social, economic, environmental and cultural aspects of the area. The absence of a holistic plan coming out of a CBNRM planning process is a serious lapse in the sustainability of such a project. In particular, it leaves out such important issues as benefit sharing plan resulting in gross financial mismanagement in most Trusts.



**Figure 2: Critical role players in Community Driven Natural Resource Management**

In many instances, CBNRM has suffered from hidden agendas of Government, Donors, Private Sector and NGOs, taking advantage of the unequal power relations between themselves and the local communities. The weak local community institutions have allowed elite capture of CBNRM benefits at the exclusion of the masses. Furthermore, CBNRM has suffered from inadequate commitment of time and resources from promoters. From the five CBNRM cases reported in this paper, there is an emergent gap of a dedicated, impartial, well qualified and well resourced facilitator with the sole role of mediating resource exploitation for local communities with other external parties (see Figure 2).

CBNRM requires a broker, along the same lines as Stockbroker, Insurance broker Real Estate broker etc. The role of the Natural Resource Management Broker (NRMB) will be to level the playing field between NRM players and brokering deals that are win-win-win and sustainable. The qualifications of a NRMB should be, a post graduate qualification that creates a well rounded professional irrespective of their undergraduate qualification. This role of a facilitator/broker that was taken lightly previously, may hold the key to the success and transformation of Community Based Natural Resource Management to Community Driven Natural Resource Management.



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